Assessing Corporate Sustainability Through Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes by Windolph, Sarah Elena
Journal of Environmental Sustainability
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 5
2011
Assessing Corporate Sustainability Through
Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes
Sarah Elena Windolph
Leuphana University Lüneburg, windolph@uni.leuphana.de
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/jes
Part of the Agriculture Commons, and the Environmental Design Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental
Sustainability by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Windolph, Sarah Elena (2011) "Assessing Corporate Sustainability Through Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes," Journal of
Environmental Sustainability: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 5.
DOI: 10.14448/jes.01.0005
Available at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/jes/vol1/iss1/5
Environmental sustainability and supply chain management - A framework of cross-functional integration... 37
Assessing Corporate Sustainability  
Through Ratings: 
Challenges and Their Causes
 
Sarah Elena Windolph 
Leuphana University Lüneburg
windolph@uni.leuphana.de
ABSTRACT: Assessing corporate sustainability is increasingly practice-relevant, not least because 
the capital market and other markets have been paying growing attention to the topic. Recently, 
ratings have become an important assessment approach and nowadays a variety of organizations 
and financial service providers conduct their own ratings. Yet, despite their growing popularity, 
ratings are criticized in research and practice. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to systematize the 
challenges that corporate sustainability ratings face: lack of standardization, lack of credibility 
of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency, and lack of independence. Furthermore, 
the paper discusses the causes of these challenges and suggests possible ways to improve the 
reliability of ratings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sustainability is a topic of growing significance 
for companies just like the contribution of 
companies is becoming essential for sustainable 
development (Dunphy, Griffiths, and Benn; 
Dyllick and Hockerts; Epstein; Schaltegger 
and Burritt). Corporate sustainability (CS) is 
understood here as an approach to systematically 
consider environmental and social issues and to 
integrate them into the economic management 
of a company (Dunphy, Griffiths, and Benn; 
Shrivastava and Hart). Increasingly, the demand 
for CS is not only driven by societal or political 
expectations, i.e. push factors, but also by the 
potential for internal organizational improvements 
(e. g., cost reduction), as well as the demand of 
consumers and investors, i.e. pull factors (Dyllick, 
Belz, and Schneidewind; Meffert and Kirchgeorg; 
Schaltegger and Wagner). Examples of this latter 
market pull are the rising demand for organic food 
(Wier and Calverley) and the growing significance 
of socially responsible investment (SRI) (Beloe, 
Scherer, and Knoepfel; Moskowitz; Sparkes 
and Cowton). 
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This increasing market demand entails the need 
for CS assessment and evaluation. But, since the 
corresponding information on individual companies 
is rarely publicly available, there is a substantial 
risk that sustainability-oriented companies are 
not recognized. Additionally, as sustainability 
commitments are hard to verify, less responsible 
companies may make use of this by greenwashing, 
that means intentionally providing incomplete or 
even false information (Darbi and Karny; Laufer; 
Ramus and Montiel). If consumers and investors 
are willing to make their purchase and investment 
decisions based on CS but only have information 
which is incomplete or which they do not trust, 
sustainability-oriented companies may in the worst 
case be crowded out of the market, although they 
actually offer what customers are looking for. 
This phenomenon is known as market for lemons 
(Akerlof): responsible companies cannot be 
identified; therefore consumers and investors are not 
willing to pay for their products or to invest in those 
companies. Consequently, those companies do not 
survive in the market. In order to prevent such a market 
for lemons, reliable information intermediaries with 
more resources to gather information and carry out 
an external CS assessment become important, for 
example consumer associations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and journalists (Chatterji 
and Toffel; Healy and Palepu; Lee and Cho; 
Rischkowsky and Döring). 
 Recently, ratings have become especially 
important for CS assessment (Chatterji and Toffel; 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes), not least 
because of the increasing interest of the capital 
market where ratings are an established tool to 
estimate the credit worthiness of, for example, 
companies (econsense; Finch; Healy and Palepu; 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Assessing 
and benchmarking CS through ratings among 
other things serves to improve accountability and 
enables cross-company comparison (Graafland, 
Eijffinger, and Smid). However, despite (or perhaps 
because of) their increasing relevance, CS ratings 
are subject to a lot of criticism, especially regarding 
their transparency (e. g., Delmas and Doctori-
Blass; Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and 
Hope; Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate 
the Raters. Phase One), their independence (e. g., 
Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Epstein; Graafland, 
Eijffinger, and Smid), and their variety (e. g., 
Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). 
 The fact that ratings try to fulfill a challenging 
task is revealed by the lack of standardization 
and best practice methods. Important reasons for 
this are the missing definition and the subsequent 
diverse perception of CS (Linnenluecke, Russell, 
and Griffiths; Schaltegger and Burritt; Seelos; 
van Marrewijk). This room for interpretation 
has not only led to a range of CS practices (e. g., 
philanthropic sponsoring activities or core business 
relevant sustainability management), but also to 
heterogeneity of assessment approaches – not only 
of ratings and SRI research but of CS assessment 
approaches in general (Delmas and Doctori-Blass; 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Table 1 offers 
an overview of CS assessments and lists examples. 
 The variety of assessment approaches that 
consumers, investors, and further stakeholders 
are increasingly confronted with poses a problem 
in its own right. This not only holds true for the 
assessment of companies but also for products. The 
organic food sector, for instance, has generated a 
“confusing multitude” of certificates and labels 
(Wier and Calverley 54). Therefore, it is difficult 
for consumers to decide which labels to trust and 
how to compare competing labels (Jahn, Schramm, 
and Spiller; Wier and Calverley). Accordingly, 
stakeholders are still unable to judge whether 
products and companies are really oriented towards 
sustainability, and thus, depend on the assessment of 
intermediaries (Rischkowsky and Döring).
Assessing Corporate Sustainability Through Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes                                   39
Against this background, the research question of 
this paper is what challenges CS ratings face and 
what their causes are. The paper is structured as 
follows. Firstly, after a short introduction to the 
relevance of ratings, it displays and systematizes 
the challenges for CS ratings based on a literature 
review. Several ratings are included for illustration 
purposes. Secondly, the paper determines the causes 
of these challenges by reviewing more general 
literature on CS and CS assessment. Thereupon, 
the paper identifies ways to improve the reliability 
of CS ratings. 
II. BACKGROUND: RELEVANCE 
OF RATINGS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE
This section elaborates on the relevance of external CS 
assessment from a theoretical perspective, and then 
highlights the practical importance of ratings in particular.
II.I   RELEVANCE OF RATINGS 
FROM A THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
CS assessment approach Examples
SRI research 
(‘in-house’)
Sarasin’s Corporate Sustainability Rating (Bank Sarasin & Co Ltd.)
ZKB Sustainability Research (ZKB)
Ratings MSCI (formerly KLD) Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Ratings 
(MSCI Inc.)
oekom’s Corporate Responsibility Rating (oekom research, oekom Corporate 
Rating)
Indices Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) (SAM’s Corporate Sustainability 
Assessment and Dow Jones Indexes; SAM; SAM Indexes GmbH; SAM and 
PwC)
 
FTSE4Good (EIRIS’ sustainability research and Financial Times Stock 
Exchange Group, EIRIS)
 
Ethibel Sustainability Indices (ESI) (Vigeo’s sustainability research and 
Standard and Poor’s, Vigeo and Forum Ethibel)
Rankings Good Company Ranking (Balzer et al.)
Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies in the World (Corporate Knights 
Inc.)
Awards German Sustainability Award (Stiftung Deutscher Nachhaltigkeitspreis e.V.)
Assessments by NGOs, 
consultants, and 
research organizations
Guide to Greener Electronics (Greenpeace)
Carbon Disclosure Project (Carbon Disclosure Project) 
Table 1: Prevalent approaches to externally assess CS.
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An important difficulty when assessing CS externally 
lies in information asymmetries (Lyon and Maxwell; 
Rischkowsky and Döring). Consumers, investors, 
and other stakeholders are not able to verify the 
sustainability claims made by companies, because 
they do not have access to the relevant information 
(Ramus and Montiel). This not only affects 
products (Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller) but also 
processes inside companies and along supply chains 
(Chatterji and Levine; Epstein). Reliable third party 
institutions with resources to gather the needed 
information become important players (Healy and 
Palepu; Lee and Cho; Rischkowsky and Döring). 
Ratings or rating organizations are one example of 
such information intermediaries. 
 Another important aspect is that CS is 
socially desired (de Boer; Epstein). Ongoing 
discussions in the media as well as the increasing 
meaning of sustainability-oriented products, for 
example in the financial market, illustrate that 
society and markets are increasingly concerned with 
the topic (Hansen, Große-Dunker, and Reichwald; 
Meffert and Kirchgeorg; Sparkes and Cowton; Wier 
and Calverley). This fact may not only motivate 
companies to get involved with sustainability 
issues and to communicate about them, but also to 
exclusively communicate positive and leave out 
negative information. In an extreme case, companies 
may even perceive an incentive to pass on false 
information in order to improve their reputation or 
market share (Darby and Karni; Laufer, Rischkowsky 
and Döring). The risk of such opportunistic behavior, 
known as greenwashing, is increased by the lack of 
a definition of CS and the large scope of different 
interpretations (van Marrewijk). 
 The outcome of such a situation may be a 
“market for (organic) lemons”: stakeholders cannot 
identify sustainability-oriented companies (hidden 
characteristics) because of a lack of information or 
of trust in the offered information. This leads to a 
diminished willingness to pay for the companies’ 
products or a lower readiness to invest. Ultimately, 
sustainability-oriented companies may be crowded 
out of the market (adverse selection) (Akerlof; 
Rischkowsky and Döring). This market failure 
probably causes negative effects on the environment 
and society when sustainability-oriented companies 
are replaced by exclusively economically-oriented 
ones. Accordingly, the contribution of companies 
to sustainable development of the economy and 
society will diminish even more.
 Both Economics of Information (e. g., 
Shapiro; Stigler; Stiglitz) as well as the principal-
agent theory (Jensen and Meckling) (and related 
approaches like the stakeholder-agency theory, 
see Hill and Jones) deal with ways to overcome 
asymmetric information or adverse selection in 
markets. They offer two basic approaches to this 
problem. The first approach is signaling (Spence). 
Signaling in this context means that companies 
emit credible signals indicating their sustainability 
orientation. Examples are the publication of 
sustainability reports offering stakeholders 
information on sustainability efforts, and the 
establishment and use of brands or labels transporting 
and substantiating sustainability related messages 
about products or companies (de Boer; Finch; Kolk). 
However, these signals only fulfill their function if 
the addressees perceive them as reliable (Müller; 
Rischkowsky and Döring). Yet, reliability is not 
always given due to the “climate of general distrust 
towards social organizations” (Renn and Levine 212) 
and the risk of opportunistic behavior. Therefore, 
signaling may be insufficient in the context of CS.
 An alternative approach to overcome 
information asymmetries is screening, which 
here means that consumers, investors, or other 
stakeholders actively search for and evaluate 
information on the sustainability performance of 
companies (Rischkowsky and Döring; see also 
Stiglitz). Compared to earlier times, the Internet 
allows for much more transparency and information 
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access today (Rezabakhsh, Bornemann, Hansen, 
and Schrader; Seelos). Yet, consumers and investors 
cannot access all relevant data as a matter of 
resource constraints (time and data access). Hence, 
information intermediaries come into play (Healy 
and Palepu; Lee and Cho; Rischkowsky and Döring). 
Ratings are an important example of this kind of 
external assessment, although screening for CS is 
complicated by the diverse perception of the concept. 
Yet, although several challenges have to be met in order 
to reliably assess CS by screening, it still appears more 
promising than signaling which makes opportunistic 
behavior easier (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). 
Furthermore, screening simplifies the comparison of 
companies which could be relevant to consumers and 
investors. Therefore, this paper focuses on ratings as 
a practice-relevant application of screening.
 Nonetheless, when differentiating between 
signaling and screening it has to be kept in mind 
that one approach cannot be seen separate from the 
other. On the one hand, the assessment made through 
screening can be used to substantiate companies’ 
signaling approaches, which might be perceived 
as more reliable than information without external 
verification (Rischkowsky and Döring). Audits, labels, 
and certificates also follow this procedure. On the other 
hand, in order to carry out their assessment, ratings at 
least partially depend on the disclosure of information 
by companies, and thus, on suitable internal metrics 
(Chatterji and Levine). For these reasons, CS signaling 
and screening are interdependent. Intermediaries 
carry out the screening process for stakeholders and 
substantiate companies’ signals. 
II.II  PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF CS
         RATINGS
CS ratings have become increasingly practice-
relevant (Chatterji and Toffel; Schäfer, Beer, 
Zenker, and Fernandes). Whereas conventional, 
finance-related ratings are used to estimate the 
credit worthiness of companies (Healy and 
Palepu), CS ratings serve to systematically and 
regularly analyze the environmental, social, 
and economic performance of companies, and, 
furthermore, allow the comparison of companies 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Finch; Graafland, 
Eijffinger, and Smid; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and 
Fernandes). Sustainability ratings are carried 
out by a variety of organizations, for example 
specialist rating agencies, analyst departments in 
banks, operators of (securities) indices, classic 
credit rating agencies, and few NGOs (Delmas 
and Doctori-Blass; Finch; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, 
and Fernandes) (see Table 1). Most CS ratings 
have been launched within the last ten to fifteen 
years, mainly because institutional investors are 
increasingly interested in sustainability-related 
or socially responsible investments (Moskowitz; 
SAM and PwC; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and 
Fernandes). Today, an independent market for 
the services of CS intermediaries has developed, 
and it is expected to grow due to the rising social 
awareness of environmental and social issues and 
related market demands. For example, the number 
of assessed companies for Sustainable Asset 
Management’s (SAM) Corporate Sustainability 
Assessment increased from 468 in 1999 to 1,237 in 
2009 (SAM and PwC). 
 Among the variety of CS assessment 
approaches ratings play a special role, since 
they not only constitute an assessment approach 
themselves but also form the basis for further 
benchmarking approaches like rankings and indices 
(for more details on ratings see Schäfer, Beer, 
Zenker, and Fernandes; for the methodologies of 
major sustainability indices see Fowler and Hope). 
Therefore, the procedures that ratings apply have 
consequences for subsequent approaches.
 Despite the visible efforts to assess CS, 
related approaches and particularly ratings are 
criticized in both research and practice (Beloe, 
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Scherer, and Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, 
Levine, and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; 
Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope, 
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid; Hansen; Sadowski, 
Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate the Raters. Phase 
One; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Hence, 
Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel (29) conclude that many 
research organizations “will have to fundamentally 
review many aspects of their research methodology 
and approach,” and Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee, and 
Ayars (5) conclude that “the market will settle on 
a few “winners”.” The challenges that come along 
with CS ratings will be discussed in the following. 
Several practice-relevant ratings are drawn upon for 
illustration purposes.
III.   CHALLENGES FOR CS 
RATINGS AND THEIR CAUSES
CS ratings are dealt with in research and practice. 
Although a certain amount of literature deals with 
the challenges for CS ratings, they have not been 
systematized so far. In section 3.1 six important 
aspects will be identified and elaborated: 
lack of standardization, lack of credibility of 
information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency, 
and lack of independence. The synthesis builds 
on a review of academic literature as well as 
practice-relevant publications on ratings, 
indices, and related assessments of CS and 
identifies those aspects that are discussed in 
several publications. Table 2 offers an overview 
of the challenges and their meaning. Building 
on this, section 3.2 identifies the causes of the 
challenges and discusses them on the basis of 
more general CS literature. 
III.I  CHALLENGES FOR CS RATINGS
III.I.I.   LACK OF STANDARDIZATION
Although CS ratings have spread, little 
standardization has been achieved. This is the result 
Rating challenges Meaning
Lack of standardization Diversity of approaches and results, no evaluation of approaches, no 
comparability (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; 
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid)
Lack of transparency Rarely full disclosure of methodology, criteria, threshold values, etc. 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg, 
Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope)
Bias Emphasis on economic, environmental, or social dimension; focus on 
investors’ needs; focus on larger companies (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; 
Chatterji and Toffel; Fowler and Hope)
Tradeoffs Aim at single score, possible compensation of unsatisfactory partial results 
(Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid)
Lack of credibility of 
information
Companies can influence rating results, missing information verification 
(Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Fowler and Hope; Healy and Palepu)
Lack of independence Relation between rating organizations and companies (AI CSRR; Beloe, 
Scherer, and Knoepfel; Healy and Palepu)
Table 2: Challenges for ratings assessing CS.
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of the varying interests and perceptions that raters 
and stakeholders have in terms of CS. Beyond that, 
even those ratings that actually do address the same 
issues and interests apply varying measures and use 
their own methodology (Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee, 
and Ayars). The competing approaches have rarely 
been evaluated in academic research so far, although 
this is regarded as crucial for the construction of 
ratings (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Sharfman) 
and indices (Fowler and Hope). Exceptions are for 
example works by Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, 
Levine, and Toffel; Chatterji and Toffel; Knoepfel; 
and Sharfman.
 Furthermore, whereas the assessed 
companies may aim at standardization where 
possible (econsense), this is not desirable from 
the stakeholders’ point of view because of their 
different perception of and interest in CS (Beloe, 
Scherer, and Knoepfel; Dillenburg, Greene, and 
Erekson; Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). Hence, 
standardization of ratings and the establishment of 
best practices are unlikely for the time being.
Another cause for the lack of rating standardization 
is company-internal CS accounting and reporting 
(Schaltegger). Ratings use publicly available 
information as well as data disclosed by companies. 
Yet, the ways that companies gather and communicate 
information are typically very different. Especially 
the measurement of social issues as well as the 
evaluation of the influence of CS on companies’ 
success is difficult and not organized systematically. 
Therefore, the data that ratings build upon is not 
necessarily comparable and quality might differ. 
This fact can distort the rating result.
III.I.II.   LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF
               INFORMATION
In order to assess CS, ratings depend on suitable 
information. As already discussed earlier, there 
is a significant lack of data availability. Thus, 
besides publicly available data (like company or 
media reports), raters at least partially depend on 
self-disclosure of companies. A lot of companies 
acknowledge the signaling function of ratings 
and take part in surveys (Dillenburg, Greene, and 
Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, 
and Fernandes), for example through investor 
relations departments which communicate with 
analysts and investors (Healy and Palepu). For 
instance, inclusion in the DJSI requires companies 
to “fill in a detailed questionnaire covering a wide 
range of weighted economic, environmental, and 
social factors” (Fowler and Hope). 
 Yet, the credibility of company information 
may be questioned, “[b]ecause managers have 
incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures” 
that will not negatively affect their competitive position 
(Healy and Palepu 425; see also Laufer). That is one 
reason why many rating organizations use additional 
publicly available information to verify data (Beloe, 
Scherer, and Knoepfel). For example, EIRIS refers 
to the information of “government and regulatory 
agencies, industry organizations, trade publications, 
campaigning bodies, academic and specialists’ reports, 
and the output of other research bodies” (Schäfer, Beer, 
Zenker, and Fernandes 72). However, this information 
does not necessarily have to be credible either. The 
verification of information remains a “significant 
challenge” for research organizations (Beloe, Scherer, 
and Knoepfel 29; see also Laufer; Ramus and Montiel).
 Additionally, Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel 
(29) observe that companies are still “by far the 
most important source of information” for research 
organizations. SAM states that their company 
questionnaire is “the most important source of 
information for the assessment” leading to the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) (SAM 
Indexes GmbH). EIRIS declares that their survey 
serves to provide “the most recent and accurate 
information available.” During the oekom rating 
procedure “considerable importance” is attached to 
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the cooperation with companies (oekom research, 
oekom Corporate Rating). Despite the inclusion 
of additional information and the fact that many 
rating organizations today fill in large parts of the 
questionnaires based on public data themselves 
(Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel), these examples 
demonstrate that companies are to some extent still 
able to influence rating results.
 Another important argument for the 
increased inclusion of publicly available data is 
‘questionnaire fatigue’ resulting from the intensive 
surveying of companies (Beloe, Scherer, and 
Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; econsense). 
Companies have to spend considerable resources 
to take part in surveys and to interact with research 
organizations (Fowler and Hope, Chatterji and 
Levine). Besides the increasing unwillingness to 
participate in surveys, another possible negative side-
effect can be that inexperienced employees like interns 
accomplish the rating survey process. This questions 
the credibility of information even more (Hansen). 
III.I.III   BIAS
Another challenging aspect for CS ratings are biases. 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes state that 
many CS ratings are biased, meaning that they put 
special emphasis either on the environmental, social, 
or economic dimension. However, overemphasizing 
either one of the three dimensions is inconsistent 
with the integrative character of CS. According to 
that, companies are required to simultaneously take 
account of and harmonize the environmental, social, 
and economic dimension (Schaltegger and Burritt). 
The particular economic bias is especially strong 
in conventional ratings that use only selective CS 
measures as add-on. However, the same bias exists 
in well-established assessment approaches like the 
DJSI, and thus, SAM’s rating (Fowler and Hope). 
Fowler and Hope find that SAM does not consider 
the three dimensions of sustainability in a balanced 
way. SAM’s assessment aims at identifying industry-
specific best in class companies and focuses on 
those that are “most likely to turn sustainability 
into shareholder value” (Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, 
and Fernandes 101). Accordingly, social and 
environmental criteria weigh less than economic 
ones (Fowler and Hope). This also applies to KLD 
Research and Analytics, Inc. (now part of MSCI 
Inc.) whose declared objective is to serve investors 
(Chatterji and Toffel). Dillenburg, Greene, and 
Erekson (169) describe the consideration of social 
criteria in the assessment of large investment firms 
as “just a collateral service.” This undifferentiated 
approach is criticized by many authors who 
highlight that ratings should be suitable for various 
stakeholders with different interests (Beloe, Scherer, 
and Knoepfel; Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson; 
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). 
 In contrast, special interest ratings may 
put more emphasis on ethical (or normative) and/
or environmental issues while neglecting other 
dimensions. One example is the sustainability 
analysis of the Calvert Social Index, in which social 
and ethical aspects are analyzed in more detail 
than environmental aspects (Calvert Group, Ltd.; 
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes).
 Biases are also relevant for the type of 
companies to be rated. A lot of ratings, rankings, 
and indices aim at identifying sustainability leaders, 
for instance the DJSI. However, most ratings focus 
on larger companies and include neither small and 
medium enterprises nor companies from emerging 
countries (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Fowler 
and Hope; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). 
Consequently, sustainability leaders may not be 
identified by this procedure, since the raters possibly 
do not even include them in the sample (Fowler and 
Hope) or they do not take part in the rating (self-
selection bias) (Finch). Another difference in the 
selection process is the usage of an existing index as 
“underlying universe” versus actively screening for 
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sustainability-oriented companies. For example, the 
Dow Jones Indexes (DJI) serve as parent indices for 
the DJSI (SAM Indexes GmbH) and several MSCI 
indices for the MSCI ESG Indices (MSCI Inc.), 
whereas the oekom universe also contains smaller 
companies and “significant non-listed bond issuers” 
(oekom research, oekom universe).
III.I.IV.   TRADEOFFS
Closely connected to biases are tradeoffs. Most 
ratings ultimately aim at producing one single 
score that is a number or letter as result of the 
rating process. For example, oekom’s rating uses 
categories between A+ and D- (oekom research, 
oekom Corporate Rating), and SAM’s rating works 
with percentages (SAM and PwC). Expressing the 
performance of companies in such a simple way 
makes it easy to understand companies’ positions 
and to compare them (Graafland, Eijffinger, and 
Smid). Nonetheless, when creating a single score 
of the individual measures across the triple bottom 
line, raters assume that “values can be reduced to one 
dimension” (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid 151) 
although they are “pluralistic in nature” (Graafland, 
Eijffinger, and Smid 140). Aiming at one single 
score means that shortcomings in one dimension 
may be compensated by a better performance in 
another (Delmas and Doctori-Blass). Hence, single 
scores probably result in a distorted picture of the 
actual sustainability performance of a company 
because it is hardly taking into account all facets of 
CS. Companies are required to embed sustainability 
management in conventional management instead 
of dealing with it in parallel. This implies that CS 
has to be linked to the strategy, core business, and 
day-to-day processes in all organizational units 
(Stubbs and Cocklin). This integration challenge 
complicates the assessment of CS, since activities, 
outcomes, and budgets are the more difficult to 
identify as sustainability-oriented the better they are 
integrated. One single score is hardly able to reflect 
these interdependencies properly. 
 Furthermore, CS is not a state to be reached 
(de Ron; Epstein; Schaltegger and Burritt). Instead, 
the concept occupies the demand for continuous 
improvement which shows its process character. 
Hence, an evaluation of CS should be carried out 
in relative terms and requires the comparison to a 
benchmark. One single score can only accomplish 
this by relating to other scores, for example of other 
companies or earlier ratings of the same company. 
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid even demand not 
to conduct cross-sector benchmarking but to limit 
comparisons to one industry. In fact, rating results 
often consist of an additional comparative score. For 
example, SAM translates sustainability scores into a 
relative industry measure (SAM and PwC). Vigeo 
and Forum Ethibel state in their rulebook on the 
Ethibel Sustainability Indices that they intentionally 
do not calculate a global company score or compile 
a ranking based on the results of the individual 
research fields. Still, especially rankings normally 
oversimplify CS assessment.
III.I.V.   LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
When discussing the lack of transparency it has to 
be pointed out positively that most of the criteria 
accounted for in ratings are not determined by the 
raters alone but together with third parties like 
NGOs or academia. This first step in the direction 
of “tripartism” (Laufer 259) serves to ensure that 
ratings are more balanced and accepted and increases 
transparency and accountability (Fowler and Hope). 
Nonetheless, the research components leading 
to rating results are rarely made fully available, 
sometimes except for key clients (Beloe, Scherer, 
and Knoepfel). This refers to the way information 
is collected, the methodology, assumptions, 
calculations, weightings, threshold values, and the 
specific criteria of the analysis (Beloe, Scherer, and 
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Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, Levine, 
and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg, 
Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Graafland, 
Eijffinger, and Smid). Of course, this does not apply 
for all ratings to the same extent, but, generally, 
academics as well as companies criticize these 
“black box” approaches (AI CSRR; Delmas and 
Doctori-Blass; econsense). For example, the general 
part of the questionnaire used for SAM’s Corporate 
Sustainability Assessment rating is open to the 
public, while the sector-specific questions are not 
(SAM and PwC; Boms). Graafland, Eijffinger, and 
Smid point to the importance of disclosing methods 
and assumptions of benchmarks to stakeholders. 
Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson (169) criticize the 
missing transparency of ratings as “troubling.” As 
long as rating processes are not transparent, their 
reliability may be questioned just like the reliability 
of the companies to be examined. This is especially 
important for solicited ratings where ratings’ 
customers, for example institutional investors, 
choose their own criteria and weightings (Finch).
III.I.VI.   LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
The relationship between companies and raters 
established in order to get the necessary information 
raises the question whether ratings are independent. 
Research organizations increasingly depend on 
the personal interaction with companies (Beloe, 
Scherer, and Knoepfel). This is especially true when 
the rating process is carried out repeatedly over 
time, which is usually the case. For example, oekom 
emphasizes the importance of the cooperation with 
companies during their rating (oekom research, 
oekom Corporate Rating) and SAM describes to 
“proactively engage with companies” (SAM and 
PwC 21). 
 The close relationship to companies might 
call for even more criticism in cases where ratings 
are conducted by financial service providers which 
already have or intend to establish further business 
relations with the companies (e. g., consultancy, 
financial analysis, or mandated risks assessments) 
(AI CSRR; Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel). These 
aspects might create conflicts of interest. They are 
discussed in the European Corporate Sustainability 
and Responsibility Research Quality Standard 
(CSRR-QS), a quality standard for CS and SRI 
research (see www.csrr-qs.org). Another potential 
conflict brought up by Healy and Palepu is the 
personal interest of financial analysts in screening 
outcomes: “analysts are rewarded for providing 
information that generates trading volume and 
investment banking fees for their brokerage houses” 
(Healy & Palepu 417). This may encourage upward 
biases of rating results. 
 One more relevant aspect in this context 
is the distinction between solicited and unsolicited 
ratings. Solicited ratings are carried out for a 
particular client and paid for (Finch). This fact also 
puts into question the independence of the ratings.
So far the paper has identified six important 
challenges that come along with CS ratings. Of 
course, more challenges can be found in the literature, 
for example in the “Rate the Raters” publications 
(Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate the 
Raters Phase One) or from a philosophical point of 
view (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). Still, the six 
challenges described here together form the most 
prominently discussed aspects. In the following, the 
paper analyzes the causes of these challenges and 
suggests ways to tackle them. 
III.II.   WHAT ARE THE CAUSES 
OF THE IDENTIFIED 
CHALLENGES?
The six challenges that CS ratings face have been 
identified as lack of standardization, lack of credibility 
of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency, 
and lack of independence. In the following, the paper 
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discusses the causes of these challenges based on 
general literature on CS and CS assessment.
III.II.I.   LACK OF RATING
             STANDARDIZATION AND THE
              COMPLEXITY OF CS
The lack of rating standardization is not only the 
outcome of the competitive market for ratings but 
also the result of the complexity of CS. Even if 
there were a commonly accepted definition of the 
concept, it would still be highly complex. However, 
research and practice have widely agreed upon the 
triple bottom line approach requiring the mutual 
consideration of environmental, social, and economic 
aspects (Elkington). According to this approach, CS 
comprises a contribution to sustainable development 
of companies on the one hand and to the environment, 
society, and economy on the other (Loew, Ankele, 
Braun, and Clausen; Schaltegger and Burritt). CS 
therefore has to be assessed not only with regard to 
its various constituent parts, but also to long-term 
or rebound effects and further interdependencies 
(Stahlmann and Clausen; Wiedmann, Lenzen, and 
Barrett). Furthermore, the results of CS cannot be 
traced by “focusing on what goes on within the 
factory fences, farm gates, or company premises” 
(Wiedmann, Lenzen, and Barrett 362). CS typically 
crosses companies’ boundaries, which implies that 
their sustainability performance is not only to be 
assessed in terms of internal measures but also of 
“impact” (Epstein; Wiedmann, Lenzen, and Barrett). 
Assessment on the impact level is dealt with more 
closely for example in development agencies, and 
despite those agencies’ long experience it remains a 
complex issue (Roche).
 The consequence is that companies’ 
sustainability performance is very difficult to assess 
(Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). That is why a 
large variety of internal and external approaches 
exist that deal differently with the assessment of CS. 
Of course, this applies for ratings and their varying 
methodologies, too, and makes standardization efforts 
like the CSRR-QS (AI CSSR) or SustainAbility’s 
“Rate the Raters” research program (Sadowski, 
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars) necessary. Accordingly, 
missing standardization does not only affect ratings 
but all CS assessment approaches since it results from 
the concept of CS itself. 
III.II.II.   LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF
              RATING INFORMATION
 AND THE LACK OF DATA
         AVAILABILITY
The question of credibility of the information that 
ratings use and offer is directly related to the lack of 
CS data availability. This problem affects internal as 
well as external CS assessment. Whereas internally 
the major problems are mostly matters of knowledge, 
information systems, and other management tools 
(Schaltegger), externally the question is rather one of 
limited data access. Most of the information required 
by ratings, if collected at all, is sensitive and rarely 
made publicly available (Lyon and Maxwell). Thus, 
not only rating organizations but all providers of CS 
assessments depend on self-disclosure of companies 
in addition to publicly available data. Therefore, 
suitable internal assessment is indispensable for the 
accomplishment of external assessment (Chatterji 
and Levine). Furthermore, due to the complexity 
of CS the question remains which data to measure. 
Accordingly, the lack of credibility of information 
results from the lack of CS data and therefore affects 
every CS assessment. 
III.II.III.   RATING BIAS AND THE  
FINANCIAL BACKGROUND OF  
RATINGS’ USERS
Another aspect is the bias of ratings. As already 
described, the emphasis on economic issues is a 
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result of the increasing interest of conventional 
analysts in sustainability. These actors probably 
have only little interest in the mutual consideration 
and integration of the economic, environmental, and 
social dimension because of their finance-oriented 
background. Investor-focused ratings rather regard 
environmental and social issues as add-on.
 Other CS assessment approaches may face 
different biases. For example, organic food labels 
and consumer-focused ratings may mainly consider 
environmental aspects. Thus, biases opposing 
the integrative assessment of CS are a challenge 
that other assessment approaches have to face 
alike. Still, the bias to the financial dimension is 
a problem that affects ratings in particular because 
of their use within the financial market and their 
stakeholders’ demands.
III.II.IV.   RATING TRADEOFFS AND    
 THE DEMAND OF RATINGS’  
 USERS 
Tradeoffs also result from the demands of ratings’ 
users. Most ratings are designed to primarily fulfill 
the needs of their main users, investors, who focus 
on traditional financial analysis (Beloe, Scherer, and 
Knoepfel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg, 
Greene, and Erekson; econsense). Presenting the 
rating results in form of single scores makes them 
easy to compare and communicate, and thus, 
suitable for investment decisions. 
 Additionally, many ratings also serve for 
rankings and indices which makes it inevitable to 
have a single, comparable figure. Beyond that, the 
communication of the results of CS assessments in a 
comprehensive, and at the same time, complete manner 
is challenging for other approaches, too. 
III.II.V.   LACK OF RATING
                TRANSPARENCY AND THEIR
                COMMERCIAL USE
A widely discussed challenge for ratings is their 
lack of transparency. When rating organizations do 
not disclose their methodology, weightings, etc., 
stakeholders cannot tell what it is that they measure. 
As long as ratings lack transparency, their credibility 
and reliability may be questioned just like the 
reliability of the companies to be examined. 
 This particular challenge results primarily 
from the young, dynamic, and competitive rating 
market and the aim to maintain commercial 
advantage (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; 
econsense). Since it can be expected that only a few 
“winners” will remain in the market (Sadowski, 
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars 5), raters try to generate 
and maintain unique selling propositions, and 
undisclosed methodologies are hard to imitate. 
However, it has to be pointed out that some rating 
organizations are already more transparent than 
others. For example, Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel 
refer to Ethibel, SAM Research, and Vigeo as best 
practice organizations, and Sadowski, Whitaker, 
and Buckingham (Rate the Raters. Phase One) 
point to Corporate Knights Inc. Furthermore, 
transparency does not only affect ratings, but is also 
discussed with regard to other “quality assurances 
and the substantiation of socially relevant claims” 
(de Boer 261), for instance certification processes 
for labels and audits (de Boer; Jahn, Schramm, and 
Spiller; Müller)
.
III.II.VI.   LACK OF RATING  
                  INDEPENDENCE AND THE
                 INTERMINGLED BUSINESS 
                  OF RATERS
The last aspect is the missing independence of 
ratings. Contact between raters and companies 
may be unavoidable, but in order to guarantee an 
objective assessment the relation should not be 
closer than necessary. In order to reliably assess 
CS, rating organizations should especially not have 
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further bonds with companies because that may 
in the worst case offer an incentive to manipulate 
rating results. Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid (139) 
argue that researchers should carry out the analysis 
in a “disinterested way.” This problem is a matter 
of governance. As rating organizations often do not 
only carry out ratings but have intermingled relations 
to the assessed companies, their independence and 
objectivity have to be questioned. 
 This aspect is reflected in a recent 
survey conducted among sustainability experts 
by Globescan. The survey shows that among 
different raters, NGOs are most trusted, followed 
by companies’ employees. Rating and ranking 
organizations come only in the third place, 
mainstream investors even later. When asked about 
the trust in particular ratings and rankings, the 
highest ranked approach, the DJSI, was classified as 
“highly trusted” by not more than 48 per cent of the 
respondents (Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham, 
Rate the Raters. Phase Two).
 This lack of belief in the credibility of 
ratings is incompatible with their purpose to increase 
transparency and reliably reduce information 
asymmetries. The situation is comparable to that 
of certifiers and auditors (Epstein; Finch). Epstein 
(246) states that “some observers have wondered 
whether, as with financial auditors, verifiers should 
act as both consultants and auditors […].” Finch 
(17) finds that “the provision by auditors of non-
audit advisory services to companies undermines 
the independence of the audit.” In the context of the 
food market, Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller describe 
the necessity of reducing auditors’ dependency on 
the companies to be certified with regard to quality 
labels. The challenge of independence particularly 
affects organizations or businesses that have further 
relations to companies. 
 The six challenges identified and described 
may have different causes, but combined they 
diminish the reliability of ratings. Against the 
background of their causes, the upcoming section 
discusses possible improvements for each challenge. 
IV.   WAYS TO IMPROVE CS
        ASSESSMENT THROUGH 
RATINGS
In summary, and as Table 3 shows, the identified 
challenges have different causes and thus have 
to be tackled differently. Some of the challenges 
can be ascribed to the concept of cs itself and 
constitute general challenges when assessing CS 
(lack of standardization and lack of credibility of 
information). Furthermore, some challenges for CS 
ratings result from the financial background and 
demands of the ratings’ users (bias and tradeoffs), 
whereas other challenges result from the commercial 
use of ratings and the intermingled business 
relations of raters (lack of transparency and lack of 
independence). In the following, recommendations 
are given to improve the reliability of ratings. 
IV.I.   GENERAL CHALLENGES 
WHEN ASSESSING CS
The lack of standardization and the lack of 
credibility of information of ratings are results of 
the complexity of CS and the lack of availability of 
CS data. Meeting these general challenges requires 
the contribution of various disciplines and actors in 
research and practice. On the one hand, the concept 
of CS itself still is hard to grasp. It can be expected 
and is desirable for the various actors involved to 
come to an agreement on a basic common definition 
in the near future. Furthermore, a more precise 
understanding of CS could be generated within the 
realm of ratings in particular, ideally in collaboration 
with third parties to include various perspectives 
on CS. A common understanding could enable 
coordinated research like the one of the Sustainable 
Investment Research International Group (SIRI) 
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(Chatterji and Levine; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and 
Fernandes). This is one way to reduce the large 
number of ratings, which could positively influence 
data availability and the credibility of data since 
fewer inquiries of greater quality would be directed 
at companies. NGOs and other third parties could 
furthermore be included in the data generation for 
external verification. So far, each rating uses their 
individual measures, which is at least inefficient 
(Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars). 
IV.II.   THE FINANCIAL BACKGROUND
            AND DEMANDS OF RATINGS’
            USERS
Furthermore, some CS rating challenges result from 
the interest and demands of ratings’ users: bias and 
tradeoffs. The particular bias towards financial 
issues and the demand for single, comparable 
scores in part even oppose the idea of CS. These 
challenges derive from the expectations of investors, 
financial analysts, and other ratings’ users with 
financial background. Instead of using CS as add-
on to conventional ratings, financial markets have 
to learn and acknowledge its integrative character 
which entails more balanced assessments than 
what is common practice. This could be achieved 
by opening ratings for a wider audience (Sadowski, 
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars) and the cooperation 
with stakeholders, especially NGOs and (potential) 
customers, which represent the environmental and 
social dimension of sustainability and thus bring in 
new perspectives (Laufer). 
 In the context of the financial market, 
identifying further Business Cases for Sustainability 
(Schaltegger and Wagner) might also help to accomplish 
a shift in the perception of CS from “knock-out criterion” 
to a more (economically) relevant aspect. Furthermore, 
it is desirable to enable stakeholders with differing 
interests to make use of ratings (Sadowski, Whitaker, 
Lee, and Ayars). Rating results should be offered to 
stakeholders in a way that enables them to carry out 
their own evaluation according to their perceptions of 
and interests in CS. This could be a way to enhance 
the acceptance of ratings and to promote sustainable 
development. So far, most ratings, especially those used 
in the financial market, are not designed to handle this 
evaluative character of CS. 
 The same holds true regarding tradeoffs: 
the publication of detailed information on the 
calculation of a final score could serve to increase 
the interest of further stakeholders and to promote 
the use of ratings. Furthermore, biases in the units 
of analysis of ratings could be reduced by their 
extension to small and medium-sized enterprises.
IV.III.  THE COMMERCIAL USE
             OF RATINGS AND THE
             INTERMINGLED BUSINESS
             RELATIONS OF RATERS
 
The lack of independence and the lack of transparency 
of ratings result from the characteristics of the 
rating organizations and the commercial use of CS 
assessment. As the Globecan results show, NGOs 
are trusted more than rating organizations, possibly 
because NGOs are less directly trying to make 
commercial use of CS assessments and because they 
rarely have further business relations with companies. 
A possible improvement for the reliability of ratings 
thus could be the prominent cooperation with one or 
more NGOs in the rating process (Laufer). However, 
independence and transparency are also relevant 
for other CS assessment approaches like audits, 
certificates, and labels. Similar recommendations 
apply here, for example consultants should not be 
auditors at the same time (Epstein).
 In order to increase their transparency, 
rating organizations could furthermore (alone or 
together with an NGO) disclose their methods, 
measures, and the content of their surveys. This 
applies to other assessment approaches like audits 
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and labels, too. A further possibility to increase the 
reliability of ratings is to make use of independent 
assurance to verify commitments, ideally with 
an NGO due to their higher credibility (Laufer; 
Ramus and Montiel). Additionally, in order to 
provide reliable information and to enhance their 
credibility, rating organizations could, at least, 
disclose potential conflicts and how they are 
handled. At best, of course, those conflicts should 
be avoided and analysts completely independent. 
This applies for other intermediaries carrying out 
audits or assessments, too, be it on the general 
capital market (Healy and Palepu) or regarding CS 
in particular. Besides self-imposed principles, the 
establishment of standards, such as the CSRR-QS 
(AI CSRR), might help to increase trust in those 
research organizations. Further research in this area 
should be a sound combination of practice demands 
and theoretical contributions. 
 Table 3 offers a summary of the aspects 
discussed in this part.
V.   CONCLUSION
Fostering sustainable development and CS in 
particular depends on suitable CS assessment 
approaches. The paper has shown that ratings, on 
the one hand, are a practice-relevant approach to 
assess CS externally. On the other hand, several 
characteristics of ratings are criticized in research 
and practice. This paper served to assemble and 
systematize the main rating challenges described 
in the literature: lack of standardization, lack of 
credibility of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of 
transparency, and lack of independence.
 An analysis of these challenges reveals that 
they have different causes. Some general challenges 
when assessing CS result from the concept of CS 
itself (lack of standardization and lack of credibility 
of information). Other challenges result from the 
demand side of ratings and show the financial 
background and demands of the ratings’ users (bias 
and tradeoffs). Last but not least, some challenges 
result from the supply side of ratings, namely the 
commercial use of ratings and the intermingled 
business relations of raters (lack of transparency 
and lack of independence). They also affect other 
CS assessment approaches like audits and labels. 
Improving the reliability of CS ratings is relevant, 
since they fulfill an important function with regard to 
Rating challenge Cause Possible improvements
Lack of standardization Complexity of CS Find a common CS understanding including 
several perspectives, coordinate research
Lack of credibility of 
information
Lack of data availability Include NGOs and third parties for external 
verification
Bias Financial background of 
ratings’ users
Sensitize ratings’ users for the integrative 
character of CS, open ratings for a wider 
audience
Tradeoffs Demand of ratings’ users See above
Lack of transparency Commercial use of ratings Disclose methodology
Lack of independence Intermingled business of 
raters
Avoid business relations to companies, include 
independent third parties
Table 3: Rating challenges, causes, and possible improvements
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overcoming the information asymmetry in the context 
of CS. Beyond that, ratings are able to positively 
influence companies’ sustainability efforts, foster 
the institutionalization of information management, 
and stimulate competition between companies 
(Chatterji and Levine; Dillenburg, Greene, and 
Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Graafland, Eijffinger, 
and Smid). And despite the somewhat negative 
effects that it may have on the understanding of CS, 
“[t]he financial industry is in a unique position to 
move corporations towards corporate sustainability” 
(Delmas and Doctori-Blass 245). What is needed 
now is a “second generation” of ratings and related 
research (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel 3) including 
NGOs and thereby other perspectives (Laufer). 
Especially those challenges resulting from the 
supplier side of ratings (see 4.3) should be tackled 
proactively in order to increase the reliability and 
acceptance of ratings as CS assessment approach. 
Overcoming CS assessment hurdles can be achieved 
by several first improvements suggested in this 
paper. But, due to the interdisciplinary character of 
CS, these problems cannot be entirely solved by one 
actor, like raters, but require further research and 
contributions from several disciplines in research 
and practice. CS assessment is a process in its own 
right – just like CS itself. 
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